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The rapid development of the modern world in regard to inter alia technical and technological 
capabilities results in a particularly high demand for well-informed political decision-making. 
This should be based on the setting of legal rules, regulations and standards. Modern nations 
and their governments as well as regional groups and organisations and the world community 
as a whole are faced today with severe security problems caused by the threats of nuclear 
proliferation and of the misuse of nuclear materials, by wars and civil wars and the weapons 
trade, by terrorism, nationalism, racism and ethnic “cleansing”, the migration of millions of 
people, food and energy shortages, psychological, social, and economic instabilities, and 
environmental pollution, to mention only some of the most pressing ones. The solution of 
these problems requires not only diplomatic skill, sound judgement and good will but also a 
thorough knowledge of certain scientific facts, correlations and interconnections. Decisions 
and regulations in fields such as nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, civil use of 
nuclear power, climate change mitigation, biotechnologies, biosafety and biomedicine all 
depend upon expert advice in order to reach reasonable and well-balanced solutions. The 
scientific community which administers and continuously reviews and enlarges the body of 
knowledge should, and usually does, feel responsible for supplying the advice needed by 
political decision-makers. While the balancing of potentially diverging positions and interests 
in decisions is the primary function of the political decision-maker, it is the role of the 
scientific community to provide for the relevant knowledge on facts and capabilities and thus 
establish a sound background for the decision-making process. The complexity of the issues 
at stake requires a process of permanent research and expert advice to governments and 
international institutions to keep pace with developments, and to rapidly react to changes. To 
enhance legitimacy, expert advice must be organised in a way that safeguards its 
independence from vested interests. 
 
In Germany, the German Research Society (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft) sees as its 
task not only the promotion and support of science but also the supply of advice to 
government, parliament and the public in scientific questions. The Union of German 
Academies of Sciences, representing seven regional academies, has just proposed to set up a 
“Convent of German Science and Letters” as an advisory instrument in questions relevant to 
society. Governments and individual government ministries in many countries, including 
Germany, as well as the United Nations and its suborganisations, have appointed science 
advisers and set up scientific advisory committees of various kinds which study the issues at 
stake and develop options for action.  
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This does not mean that the best advice is always available everywhere and is heeded by those 
concerned. If it were, the state of affairs on this planet would be different, although the 
complexity of many problems and the inherited traits of human nature will always set limits to 
what the “best advice”, whatever its definition, can do. Nevertheless, there is widespread 
criticism of the way in which government-appointed advisory bodies operate. Certainly, they 
are often helpful in finding answers to clear-cut questions, but they are usually content with 
just this task. In many cases, they are not authorised to supply answers to questions they have 
not been asked. On the other hand, it is often necessary to take a long-range view and tackle 
questions which the politicians have not yet recognised or, because of their potential 
preoccupation with winning the next elections, do not consider useful for this purpose. For 
this reason some scientific academies and societies, and various associations have set up 
committees and have organised conferences on issues of public interest, in order to make 
available information on the state of affairs in particular fields, on existing risks and long-term 
consequences, of measures taken or planned, and on alternative options. Frequently 
international co-operation is sought for the development of solutions for global problems. The 
Pugwash Conferences and the Amaldi Conferences are of this type. Their preoccupation from 
their very beginnings has been with the threat of nuclear weapons. Later other weapons of 
mass destruction and other threats to global security were included in their agenda. 
 
Unfortunately, it must be stated that much of the relevant knowledge that is obtainable is not 
used by those who are meant to use it, either justifiably so because the advice based on it 
starts from unrealistic premises, or for reasons of negligence and poor management: because 
the advice does not reach the decision-makers in time, is not presented in a way conducive to 
application, or is incomplete in one way or another so that its use would lead to undesirable 
long-term results. 
 
In this paper we shall try to consider the various reasons which make the production and the 
implementation of valid scientific advice to political decision-makers and to the public such a 
difficult undertaking.  
 
 
1. Who is able to give scientific advice? 
 
National Academies and National Scientific Societies usually have among their members the 
best experts in any field. However, the problems often require an interdisciplinary approach, 
and the experts are not necessarily able or willing to look beyond the borders of their field of 
specialisation. Interdisciplinary co-operation is sometimes not easy to organise. The guiding 
principle should be, of course, to include all the disciplines of knowledge whose expertise is 
needed for assessing the existing situation and the options available for action with regard to 
their respective risks and benefits. One difficulty here is that different disciplines often have 
developed their own special ways of thinking and of expressing themselves so that the same 
terms may have different meanings in different fields of scholarship. Sometimes, however, the 
need is felt to check, or supplement, the work of government-employed experts by an 
independent group of scientists who may belong to the same disciplines as the former but may 
start from different assumptions.  
 
Sometimes a private group of scientists takes the initiative when its members see the need for 
it. Examples are the Pugwash and the Amaldi Conferences, the Union of Concerned 
Scientists, the Federation of American Scientists, the Federation of German Scientists (VDW) 
and many others. In some cases membership is by invitation only, in others anybody can join 
who is associated with a scientific institute. Not all of them have the same standing in the 
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public perception. Statements by Nobel Prize Winners find particular attention by the media, 
even if the laureates express views on issues outside their own field of expertise. 
 
This shows the need to distinguish carefully between private views expressed by ordinary 
citizens, even when they are a group of particular professional distinction, and carefully 
researched statements by experts in the fields relevant for the problem under consideration. 
 
A special problem is the availability of independent experts in technically very complex areas 
where virtually all experts are government-employed. Cases of this type arise, for instance, in 
the fields of nuclear weapons and of space technology. Here it is the responsibility of 
academies and scientific societies to create committees of independent scientists with a 
professional background enabling them to study, understand and, if necessary, criticise the 
work done by the government experts. 
 
Occasionally, the problem of co-operation between different scientific organisations arises. 
There may be suggestions for joint action in order to maximise public attention for their 
critical stance. On the other hand, in order to preserve their independent reputation, well-
known organisations are often reluctant to join campaigns not initiated by themselves. 
 
 
2. Why are governments sometimes reluctant, or not ready, to accept well-founded 
advice? 
 
The reluctance of governments to listen seriously to experts is widespread. Most politicians 
prefer to follow their own plans and to listen to scientific advice only if it agrees with these 
plans of their own. Advice is unwelcome if accepting it means abandoning a course originally 
chosen. Why is this so? It is partly the fault of the governments and partly the fault of the 
experts. The political advice offered by non-political experts is often ignored by politicians 
for the following reasons: 
 
a. Accepting the advice might require unpopular measures which, in turn, might 
jeopardise the outcome of the next election. 
 
b. The advice given might have been espoused and advocated by the opposition party. 
Accepting it might look like yielding to the opposition. 
 
c. The explanation offered for the advice may seem unintelligible, or there may be no 
plausible explanation at all accompanying the advice. In this case the suspicion may 
be justified that the advice given is based on doubtful assumptions or is aimed, in a 
one-dimensional manner, at just one single goal, without assessing properly the by- 
and after-effects that cannot be excluded. But often it is just these by- and after-effects 
which turn out to be of paramount political importance. 
 
d. The advice given may not have taken into account all aspects which successful 
politicians have to keep in mind, so that the latter felt entitled not to take serious what 
they were told by the experts of individual disciplines. There may not have been an 
all-encompassing, interdisciplinary body which co-ordinated the “sectoral” advice 
given by the experts of the various isolated disciplines.1  
                                               
1 To avoid a deficit of this kind, the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS)  has recently 
established a Center for Science, Technology and Security Policy. This Center is intended to serve as a point of contact 
for Congress and the executive branch on the one hand and university-based antiterrorism research centers on the other 
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e. The advice may have been delivered at an inopportune time, or to the wrong address. 
It is a well-known problem for scientists to obtain enough knowledge of details of the 
political machinery to know where and by whom at which level the relevant decisions 
are really prepared, what is at the top of the current political agenda in relation to the 
question to be tackled, what are the perceived political or economic obstacles to the 
solutions proposed, and which options exist for overcoming the obstacles. 
  
As a general rule scientific advisers to governments should refrain from suggesting what 
should be done unless they are told precisely which goal is to be reached and which boundary 
conditions are to be observed in approaching this goal. What should be done is a political, not 
a scientific decision. It often occurs, however, that scientific institutions, instead of offering a 
survey of the different options available for coping with a given situation, instead of estimating 
conservatively the risks, benefits and costs for each option, including the potential long-term 
consequences of side- and after-effects in other areas, limit themselves to isolated warnings 
and to recommendations as to what should, or should not, be done. In the absence of a 
complete picture in the light of all disciplines, it is then easy for politicians to evade the issue 
by concentrating on an area where the criticised measures have positive effects (for instance, 
by considering that disregard for environmental protection has short-term economic 
advantages).  
 
With the assistance of science and technology it would no doubt be feasible in many cases to 
foresee the occurrence of by- and after-effects of human activities. They could be taken into 
account and made part of the overall planning. Countermeasures could be prepared, or the 
activities planned could be replaced by others with less harmful consequences. As the main 
effects and the by-effects often occur in different fields of specialisation (in security policy and 
in psychology, for instance, or in economy and in climate research), multidimensional thinking 
and interdisciplinary collaboration are required. Because of the global character of many 
problems, international co-operation is also indicated. 
 
When scientists and scholars forecast what is going to happen they should clearly state under 
which assumptions they have come to that particular conclusion, and what the uncertainties 
are. In their advice to governments and the public they should limit themselves generally to 
explaining what the options for action are that could be followed, and what the potential risks, 
costs and benefits are that each option entails. These rules are often ignored so that decision-
makers do not feel motivated to consider in earnest the advice given.  
 
On the other hand, scientists and scholars should not wait until they are called upon to give 
advice. When signs of danger become visible in public developments which seem to go 
unnoticed by the authorities then it becomes the duty of the institutions of science to raise 
their voices, point out the facts and their potential consequences and specify the available 
remedies, if there are any. 
 
 
3. At which levels is scientific advice needed? 
 
Tasks for scientific advice can be found on four levels: 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
hand. Its role will be both informational and catalytic. It will respond quickly to requests for scientific information. For 
policy-makers needing scientific data on security issues related to antiterrorism the Center will offer “one-stop 
shopping”. (PHYSICS TODAY, July 2004, page 30). 
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a. the level of science and letters: it may be necessary to have knowledge of the nature of 
certain problems, of latent and open conflicts, of their origins, and of the possibilities for 
dealing with them;  
 
b. the level of practical policy: options for concrete action have to be worked out, with costs, 
benefits and risks assessed for each option, as mentioned in 1; 
 
c. the level of the media: politicians and the public have to be informed about the situation so 
that the required political measures - even if unpopular at the outset - get the necessary 
support; 
 
d. the level of education: the young generation has to be kept informed about the state of 
global affairs so that future leaders are prepared for the tasks they will have to tackle. 
Knowledge is not inherited, it must be taught and learned. 
 
Scientists and scholars are able, and therefore have a special responsibility, to work at all of 
these four levels.  
 
 
4. What are the channels through which scientific advice is made available? 
 
Governments and the public can obtain scientific advice either from documents prepared by 
scientific institutions within the government and by government-appointed experts, or from 
memoranda and public statements issued by scientific institutions, by NGOs or by individual 
groups of scientists. Proceedings of scientific conferences on issues of public concern are also 
potential sources of information and advice useful for decision-makers. The readiness of 
governments to accept advice “from outside”, i.e. from non-governmental sources, is often 
rather limited and may have to be enhanced by special lobbying.  
 
It is the task of the media to inform the general public about the current issues and the 
available options for action.  
 
It is an important question by which legal means the independence of scientific advisers to 
governments, official advisers as well as non-governmental ones, can be secured in the 
interest of truthful, unbiased information on the potential risks associated with human 
activities and in particular with government policies. The discussion on legal questions of 
independent scientific advice to governments has to distinguish between different structural 
forms of expert advice, in particular between, firstly, institutionalised bodies of experts that 
are established by statute or decree to advise governments and, secondly, publicly and/or 
privately funded research institutions that function as “think-tanks”, and, thirdly, experts who 
are asked for their opinion more or less informally by certain politicians, and, fourthly, 
concerned members of the scientific community who contribute to the public debate without 
request by members of the government. 
 
 
5. The legal relationship between governments and scientific research  
 
The legal relationship between the state and scientists is governed by a conglomerate of 
rights, freedoms and obligations. First of all, a distinction has to be drawn between substantial 
constitutional law that, at least in democratic states, safeguards the principle of scientific 
freedom on the one hand and procedural issues on the other, concerning, for example, how to 
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establish an independent expert commission by law. The substantial freedom of research is a 
conditio sine qua non for independent expert advice to governments. However, the freedom of 
scientific research does not go completely unregulated or unlimited despite its constitutional 
guarantees. Laws and regulations might either prohibit scientific research in certain branches 
of science, or political decisions may regulate research by directing public funds. The “soft” 
regulation by the targeted direction of funds is the regular practice, while, due to 
constitutional restraints, the legal prohibition of research must be considered the exception. 
Such exceptions as in the case of the prohibition of reproductive cloning of humans and 
related regulations on research on human embryonic stemcells raise legal difficulties and 
public dispute.  
 
6. Guiding principles to safeguard quality and independence of expert advice 
 
The quality and independence of research and advice is influenced by a variety of factors. The 
central issue is to provide for a broad basis of expert opinion from different disciplines or 
branches of research, to establish principles for their inclusion in decision-making processes 
and to keep expert advice unbiased. Naturally, not all issues subject to decision-making can 
be supported by expert commissions, since the decision-making process would become 
intolerably slow. A line has to be drawn between issues that are as important as they are 
difficult to deal with by decision-makers. For priority issues in need of multidisciplinary 
approaches expert commissions should be established by law or decree explicitly 
safeguarding independence and transparency regarding procedures for appointment and length 
of the term of service on the board. Further procedural details can be regulated by the statutes 
of the relevant meeting. Another distinction has to be made between expert advice on the 
national level and expert advice to international institutions because the structural setting and 
legal framework governing the decision-making process is quite different in the two cases. 
However, some principles that shall govern expert advice can be generalised. 
 
a. Transparency and accountability 
 
The overriding principle of high-quality and independent expert advice is transparency. This 
principle which can be guaranteed by rules and regulations should apply to all aspects of the 
selection process, in particular who is asked for advice, by which procedures advice is 
obtained, what recommendations were given and how politics reacted to the 
recommendations. The principle of transparency enhances legitimacy of the decision reached 
by the government. 
 
b. The multidisciplinary approach 
 
As mentioned above, many issues of modern decision-making require input from more than 
one branch of science. A multidisciplinary approach is not restricted to issues where natural 
and social scientists shall work together but also refers to different branches of natural 
sciences. If, for example, advice on weapons of mass destruction is required it will in general 
not be sufficient to consult experts on nuclear physics. In general, it must be safeguarded that 
all relevant disciplines are represented in the relevant body that functions as a regular advisor 
or in ad-hoc expert hearings. 
 
c. Nomination 
 
If expert advisory commissions are established, the choice of their members is particularly 
important. Regulations can serve to prevent that experts are members of the legislative or 
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have close industrial ties. It may be desirable, for the sake of independence and transparency, 
to invite proposals from the leading national research institutions, and then appoint members 
from the list of their suggestions. 
7. Advisory commissions in international institutions 
In principle the same considerations to keep expert advice unbiased and of high standard that 
are valid on the national level also apply to the international level. Most multilateral 
environmental agreements, e.g. the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change have established expert bodies for technical 
advice that report and give recommendations to the Conferences of the Parties. A lack of 
transparency and, potentially, a lack of quality and independence, however, results from the 
fact that the bodies consist of appointed government representatives with expertise in the 
relevant fields. The process of appointment by the national governments is not regulated. 
Furthermore, as government representatives the experts are not necessarily expected to 
discuss issues independent of their government’s political stance. 
 
 
8. What can the scientific community do to supply useful advice to decision-makers and 
the public in questions of general concern?  
 
The first step, obviously, should be some sort of stocktaking. There should be a careful 
analysis of: 
 
a. the measures that are already under way to deal with the problem under consideration. 
(Are they appropriate and are they sufficient, are they all that can be done?),  
 
b. the results obtained so far, 
 
c. the difference between the results obtained and the results desired, 
 
d. the reasons for the difference. Are there reasons to believe that better results could 
have been obtained, had certain recommendations been taken into account? If so, what 
were the obstacles to implementing the recommendations?  
 
The next step should be to consider carefully the quality of the existing guidelines or 
recommendations and the possibilities for improving them, assessing in advance the potential 
obstacles to their implementation as well as the existing ways and means for overcoming the 
obstacles. Questions to be asked in this context are the following: 
 
i. Are the scientific recommendations given, or to be given, presented in a form 
convincing to decision-makers? 
 
ii. Are they based on interdisciplinary research including economists, historians, 
psychologists, political scientists, etc.? Or do the recommendations, for instance, 
neglect economic, historical, psychological, political aspects or obstacles that should 
have been taken into account?  
 
iii. Are there gaps in knowledge which could be filled by more research? 
 
iv. Was there a lack of publicity so that the available options and their risks and benefits 
did not become known sufficiently well to the public and to the decision-makers? 
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v. Is there a lack of political will discernible because the available recommendations are 
unpopular due to insufficient explanation of the alternatives? 
 
Usually, there exist several possible solutions, each with its specific advantages, 
disadvantages, risks and costs. Which of these solutions seems to be preferable in security 
policy, depends on the interests of the parties negotiating with each other. An obvious 
question is: Are the benefits, risks and costs associated with any one solution distributed 
equally among the negotiating parties and/or the governments and nations they represent, or 
will one party bear most of the burdens while another one will enjoy most of the benefits? In 
the name of intergenerational equity decision-makers who are aware of their long-range 
responsibilities should ask: Will only the present generation have the advantages from the 
chosen solution whereas future generations will have to pay the costs? 
 
 
9. What is involved in evaluating different options for action? 
 
The necessity to investigate different options for the solution of problems will require finding 
carefully balanced answers to the questions under consideration, a thorough analysis of the 
relevant facts and developments, their interconnections and trends, and of the probabilities 
and uncertainties involved. The preparation of detailed options may involve lengthy, 
interdisciplinary investigations. To choose among the options will be the task of the decision-
makers in the centres of political power or of their deputies at the negotiation table. The 
scientists can only tell them what the options are, indicating the long-range risks, costs and 
benefits to be expected for each option. Given the complexity of many problems on the 
agenda of today’s international negotiations, a considerable number of preparatory meetings 
of scientific experts is often required before clear-cut alternative options can be presented to 
the political decision-makers.  
 
Whenever a technical solution that seems necessary from an overall and long-range point of 
view turns out to be unacceptable politically at the time being, it will be necessary to 
determine carefully the nature of the obstacles. Scientists sometimes do not have sufficient 
access to the realities of political life so that their advice disregards human and political 
factors and thus becomes unusable. This is why the analysis of the reasons for the non-
implementation of scientifically convincing recommendations is so important. The next step 
should then be to work out soberly and unpolemically what the options are for overcoming the 
obstacles, and in which way the public could be informed and educated so that the removal of 
the obstacles becomes feasible politically. If necessary, the public must be convinced that the 
advice given on scientific grounds is sound, and that the politicians in charge should follow it 
if they do not want to lose public support. 
 
 
10. How effective are the Amaldi and the Pugwash Conferences? 
 
The purpose of the Pugwash Conferences is “to bring together, from around the world, 
influential scholars and public figures concerned with reducing the danger of armed conflict 
and seeking co-operative solutions for global problems. Meeting in private as individuals, 
rather than as representatives of governments and institutions, Pugwash participants exchange 
views and explore alternative approaches to arms control and tension reduction with a 
combination of candour, continuity, and flexibility seldom attained in official East-West and 
North-South discussions and negotiations. Yet, because of the stature of many of the Pugwash 
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participants in their own countries (as, for example, science and arms-control advisers to 
governments, key figures in academies of science and universities, and former and future 
holders of high government office), insights from Pugwash discussions tend to penetrate 
quickly to the appropriate levels of official policy-making”.2 In the period of strained official 
relations and few unofficial channels during the Cold War, the fora and lines of 
communication provided by Pugwash played useful background roles in helping lay the 
groundwork for the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, the 
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972, and the 
Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993. Subsequent trends of generally improving East-West 
relations and the emergence of a much wider array of unofficial channels of communication 
have somewhat reduced Pugwash’s visibility while providing alternate pathways to similar 
ends, but Pugwash meetings have continued until the present to play an important role in 
bringing together key analysts and policy advisers for sustained, in-depth discussions of the 
crucial arms-control issues of the day. Since this is the aim of the Pugwash Conferences, it 
may be said that they are continuing to fulfil their purpose. But it is hard to say to what extent 
the results of the Pugwash meetings of the more recent years had an impact on the 
deliberations and decisions of decision-makers in governments. 
 
Whereas the participants of Pugwash Conferences meet and discuss as private individuals, as 
mentioned above, not representing any organisation, the participants of the international 
Amaldi Conferences of Academies of Sciences and of National Scientific Societies on 
Problems of Global Security are delegates of the academies of sciences and national scientific 
societies of their home countries. The topics of these conferences are similar to those of the 
Pugwash conferences, they concern mostly questions of arms control and only to a small 
extent problems of security in a wider sense. The main purpose of the Amaldi Conferences is 
to keep the scientific community up to date with the developments in the production and 
control of weapons of mass destruction so that independent experts become available as 
counterparts to government experts in parliamentary hearings, public discussions, and in the 
media. Therefore, there is less emphasis on issuing public statements after Amaldi 
Conferences than there is after Pugwash Conferences. But the proceedings of Amaldi 
Conferences are made available to interested government departments and parliamentary 
committees, at least in Germany. In a few cases, foreign ministry officials and members of 
parliamentary committees have taken part in Amaldi Conferences. Nevertheless, there is 
certainly room for improvements in the effectiveness of the Amaldi Conferences, internally as 
well as externally: internally on the side of the academies and scientific societies in the 
intensity of their participation, and externally in the drive of their leaders for making available 
the expertise gained at Amaldi Conferences to those decision-makers on the national and 
European levels and at the United Nations who ought to use it. This would imply starting a 
learning process on how to overcome the obvious obstacles to a better communication 
between science and governance.  
 
DISCUSSION: 
 
KLAUS GOTTSTEIN – Just a brief reply to what Professor Haeckel said.  Professor Haeckel, if I 
understood him correctly, asked:  “Why do governments need scientific advice if they already 
know what they want to do?”  That is usually the case, so why do they need advice?   
 
                                               
2 PUGWASH CONFERENCES ON SCIENCE AND WORLD AFFAIRS. (A Brief Description). Text issued by the 
Pugwash Central Office, London, September 1995. 
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 Well, if governments know what they want to do, they often do not know how to 
achieve this purpose.  If they have already a clear goal, like putting a man on the moon, they 
often still don’t know how to do that.  Then the scientists can help them to achieve that goal. 
 
But it can also be that the scientists are forced to say:  “This cannot be done.” This was 
the case when President Reagan said he wanted to protect the United States from any enemy 
rocket hitting the area of the United States.  The scientific answer was that some sort of anti-
missile system can certainly be set up but it will only be possible to catch some of the 
incoming rockets, not all of them. To catch all of them would get so expensive that in practice 
it cannot be done.   
 
 So there are cases where the government knows what it wants to do and where 
scientists can tell them whether or not that is possible and what the consequences would be.   
 
 In the case of the reactor in Bavaria, near Munich, it was clear that the Bavarian 
government wanted the reactor, whereas the federal government, setting different priorities, 
was against it.  But all scientists, on both sides, were agreed that such a reactor could be built.   
They only started  from different premises, depending on the side which they advised.  There 
are benefits and there are risks.  One side claimed that the benefits outweigh the risks.  The 
other side maintained that the risks, though small, were unacceptable.  But that were political 
judgements, not scientific ones. That’s why the scientists supporting the Bavarian government 
for the reactor and the scientists supporting the federal government against the reactor 
essentially agreed on the technical aspects, but they started from different assumptions about 
the acceptability of risks.   
 
 Then there are cases where the government does not know what to do, how to deal 
with a situation.  An example is the present economic situation in the European Union and 
particularly in Germany.   
 
 As I said, scientific advisers should never say what a government should do, they only 
should show what the options are, with their benefits and their risks.  In the economic case, 
for instance, there are several routes which the governments could follow.  Each has benefits, 
chances and risks. The scientists, in this case economic scientists, technologists and so on, can 
just tell the governments for each of the routes what the possible consequences could be, what 
might happen with which probability (of course, nobody knows exactly what is going to 
happen, but you can estimate the probability). Then it might be that the probability of bad 
consequences (more unemployment, more deaths, for instance) is such that a government 
says:  “We don’t want to take that risk”.   
 
This is how scientific advice SHOULD be given. Unfortunately, scientists often make 
the mistake that they tell their government what it should do or what is going to happen 
without mentioning options and probabilities. 
 
 So I think Prof. Haeckel is wrong in assuming that no independent scientific advice is 
needed. It is needed in both of the following cases: 
1.) The government knows what it wants, but it doesn’t know how to achieve it.   
2.) The government does not know how to deal with a certain situation. Then 
scientists might be able to show them the options, with the potential consequences 
(benefits and risks). Ideally, also with the consequences in areas other than those 
under present consideration, for instance in the social area, when a decision is 
taken in a field belonging to natural science.   
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 As I mentioned in my talk, it may be that in order to protect the environment 
something has to be done that has short-term negative consequences for the economy, but in 
the long run is necessary because otherwise with the deterioration of the environment also the 
economy would suffer.   
 
 
 
 
 
